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Abstract 
Policy diffusion refers to the process by which a political innovation – like the introduction of a 
novel emission tax – disseminates over time among countries. In order to analyze this issue from an 
economic point of view we develop a simple two-country-model of the taxation of emissions in 
presence of (possible) policy diffusion. Contrary to the usual Nash setting of simultaneous decision 
making we consider a Stackelberg game: In the first step the domestic government introduces an 
emission tax td thus acting as Stackelberg-leader, in the second step the foreign government decides 
whether or not to introduce an emission tax tf and in the third step the firms decide on their output 
quantities to be sold on a third country’s market. For the case of an exogenous given probability of 
policy diffusion we show that the optimal domestic tax rate is c.p. the higher, the higher the prob-
ability of policy diffusion is. Moreover, we explore under which conditions first-mover behaviour 
by the domestic government leads to a higher tax rate compared to the Nash solution In the next 
step we introduce an endogenous probability of policy diffusion by combining our model with a 
strategic lobbying approach. As a result, the probability of policy diffusion is c.p. the smaller, the 
higher domestic tax rate td is. Consequently, in fixing the optimal tax rate the domestic government 
has to account for the foreign firm’s lobbying activities otherwise it will choose a tax rate too high.  
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 1. Introduction 
An essential topic of strategic environmental policy models is the reaction of one govern-
ment upon the policy decision of its counterpart. Decades of research within the political 
sciences contributed to a conceptual abundance in terms of how trans-national governance 
functions, which ultimately coalesces into three explanations (Elkins & Simmons 2005): 
(1) policy makers respond similarly to similar conditions in an independent and uncoordi-
nated way; (2) the propagation of policies ensues from an interdependent and coordinated 
process (Jörgens 2004); (3) policy makers decide uncoordinatedly but in doing so they 
consider their counterparts’ choices. The latter explanation, which has also been dubbed 
“uncoordinated interdependence” (Elkins & Simmons 2005, p. 35), refers to the diffusion 
of policies. According to the majority of scholars we view policy diffusion as the process 
by which a political innovation – like the introduction of a novel emission tax – dissemi-
nates over time among countries. Rogers 1995, p. 5). This implies that at least one country 
has to act as a first-mover in terms of policy making. The choice of the first-mover is then 
expected to alter the probability of further policy adoptions (Strang 1991). These notions 
can be readily translated into a non-cooperative Cournot-game in which a government e.g. 
sets an emission tax under consideration of the other player’s decision whereas no coordi-
nation among each other occurs. A domestic government that acts as a first-mover thus 
plays Stackelberg. Therefore, this setting involves a game-sequence that departs from the 
usual simultaneous decision-making. 
Consequently, the incorporation of policy diffusion into a strategic environmental policy 
game opens up new vistas on the optimal taxation of emissions. We can analyze how the 
prospect of policy diffusion affects the decisions of a government concerning the optimal 
emission tax. In doing so, we start with an exogenous probability of policy diffusion and 
ask how this probability influences the optimal domestic tax rate. In the next step we ex-
tend our analysis by asking how the results change if we endogenize the probability of pol-
icy diffusion by combining our model with a strategic lobbying approach. We then show 
that (1) the adverse impact on the foreign firm’s profits and (2) the foreign firm’s political 
influence govern the foreign policy maker’s decision whether to adopt the domestic taxa-
tion or not. This mechanism, in turn, influences the decision of the domestic government. 
Contrary to previous models (cf Simpson & Bradford 1996), we therefore investigate a 
novel mechanism in a strategic environmental policy game. Further insights into the prop-
erties of policy diffusion may consequently shed more light on the deadlocked discussion 
on ecological dumping: strategic environmental policy models predominantly predict lax 
environmental regulation, since weak policies are assumed to offer a comparative cost ad-
vantage, but this result only finds little if any empirical support (Jaffe et al. 1995). 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model. 
Section 3 provides the equilibrium domestic tax rate in the case of an exogenously given 
probability of policy diffusion. Section 4 then compares the results of our Stackelberg-
setting with the conventional Nash-Equilibrium. In section 5 we briefly discuss the deter-
minants of policy diffusion from an empirical point of view. In section 6 we combine our 
model with a strategic lobbying approach which serves for the endogenization of the prob-
ability of policy diffusion. Finally, in section 7 we summarize the main conclusions of our 
model.  
2. The Model  
Consider a model with one domestic firm indexed by “d” and one foreign firm indexed by 
“f”. Both firms produce a homogenous good which they sell on a third country’s market. 
Inverse market demand is linear and downward sloping, i.e. )yy(ap fd +−=  where  
(j=d,f) denotes the output of firm j which results from Cournot quantity competition. For 
simplicity, production costs are neglected, but it is assumed that production leads to the 
emission of a pollutant which is harmful to the environment of the respective country. The 
relationship between output and emission is described by a fixed emission coefficient ε>0. 
Environmental damages are given by a quadratic damage function . In order to 
guarantee an internal solution with positive tax rates we assume  for j=d,f.
jy
2
jjj )y(D εγ=
)4/(1 2j ε>γ 1 
Moreover, to motivate the domestic government’s role as a first-mover in environmental 
policy we assume that the domestic damage parameter is higher than its foreign counter-
part )( fd γ>γ . The difference between the damage parameters can either be due to a higher 
domestic preference for environmental quality or to a more vulnerable domestic environ-
ment.  
The game under consideration consists of three stages. In the first stage the domestic gov-
ernment introduces an emission tax td which initiates the process of possible policy diffu-
sion. In the second stage policy diffusion occurs with a probability of ]1,0[∈σ  which 
prompts the foreign government to introduce an emission tax tf. Without policy diffusion − 
i.e. with a probability σ−1  − no foreign emission tax emerges. In the third stage the firms 
choose their output level given the governments’ decisions from the first and the second 
stage. 
To begin with we treat the probability of policy diffusion as exogenous. However, in Sec-
tion 5 we discuss the determinants of policy diffusion and in Section 6 we introduce an en-
                                                 
1 In the case of  the effect of strategic trade policy dominates and the governments will subsi-
dize their industries.   
)/( 2j 41 ε<γ
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 dogenous probability of policy diffusion by combining the above model with a strategic 
lobbying approach.  
By setting their respective emission taxes both governments aim at maximizing national 
welfare which is given by the firms’ profits plus tax revenues net of environmental dam-
ages. In contrast to the Nash-approach employed by e.g. Simpson and Bradford (1996) in 
their article on strategic environmental policy, the sequence of decisions described above 
establishes a Stackelberg-relationship between the two governments: Provided that policy 
diffusion occurs the optimal foreign tax rate tf depends on the domestic tax rate td. Hence, 
we can derive a reaction function tf(td) which has to be accounted for by the domestic gov-
ernment in stage one of the game.  
3. Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
Due to the sequence described above, the model can be solved by backwards induction. In 
the third stage for the case with policy diffusion profit maximization leads to the output 
levels  and (see Appendix I).32a /)]tt([)t,t(y dffdPd −ε+= 32a /)]tt([)t,t(y fdfdPf −ε+= 2 
Analogously, we obtain  and  for the case without 
policy diffusion. The accompanying profit levels of the firms are  for 
j=d,f and i=P,N.  
32a /)]t[)t(y dd
N
d ε−= 3a /]t[)t(y ddNf ε+=
2
fd
i
jfd
i
j )t,t(y)t,t( =π
In the second stage, the welfare function to be maximized by the foreign government in the 
case of policy diffusion is given by   
This leads to the reaction function: 
.)]t,t(y[)t,t(yt)t,t()t,t(w 2fd
P
fffd
P
fffd
P
ffdf εγ−ε+π=
 
[1] 
)2(4
)14)((
)( 2
2
εγε
εγε
f
fd
df
ta
tt +
−+= .               
 
Due to  we obtain )/(1 2f 4ε>γ 0tt df >∂∂ , i.e. the two tax rates are strategic complements. 
Moreover, the increase in tf induced by a marginal increase in td is c.p. the higher, the 
higher the emission coefficient ε and the damage parameter γf are. By inserting the reaction 
function [1] into the above results for we can express the output levels in the case 
with policy diffusion solely in terms of the domestic tax rate td, where the accompanying 
profit levels are again given by : 
)t,t(y fd
P
j
2
d
P
jd
P
j )t(y)t( =π
 
                                                 
2 We use the superscripts “P” and “N” to indicate the case with and the case without policy diffusion. All 
calculations have been done using Mathematica version 5.2. The program file is available from the authors 
on request. 
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Now we turn to the first stage where the domestic government introduces the tax rate td 
which may trigger the process of policy diffusion. For simplicity, we assume that the do-
mestic government behaves risk neutral and aims at maximizing expected welfare which is 
given by )t(w)1()t(w)]t(w[E dNddPddd ⋅σ−+⋅σ=  with 
 for i=P,N. Accounting for the results derived 
above concerning output and profit levels, maximization of expected welfare leads to the 
following tax rate:  
2
d
i
ddd
i
ddd
i
dd
i
d )]t(y[)t(yt)t()t(w εγ−ε+π≡
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In interpreting  we start with the extreme case of probability ∗dt 0=σ . Under this condition 
[3] reduces to )](/[)]([t 3d2d0d 2414a εγ+ε−εγ==σ∗ . This expression represents the optimal 
solution in the case of a pure national emission tax that is unbiased by any prospect of pol-
icy diffusion. Due to  we obtain )/(1 2d 4ε>γ 0t 0d >=σ∗ . Hence, the positive welfare effects 
of reduced emissions always outweigh the negative effects of reduced output such that the 
introduction of  pays even if there is no chance for policy diffusion.  ∗dt
For the general case with 10 ≤σ≤  we obtain 0/td >σ∂∂ ∗  as shown in Appendix II.3 Conse-
quently, the optimal domestic tax rate is c.p. the higher, the higher the probability of policy 
diffusion σ is. The same holds with respect to the damage parameters γd and γf, whereas the 
impact of a marginal increase of the emission coefficient ε is ambiguous. Since the domes-
tic and the foreign tax rates are strategic complements, the same conclusions hold for the 
comparative statics concerning  which can be obtained from inserting  into reaction 
function [1]. 
∗
ft
∗
dt
Next, we analyze how variations in the probability of policy diffusion will affect domestic 
welfare in equilibrium. In doing so, we have to distinguish between an ex ante and an ex 
post perspective. In the ex ante perspective it is not clear whether policy diffusion will oc-
cur in the end such that the relevant magnitude is expected welfare ; in the ex )]t(w[E dd ∗
                                                 
3 Note that 0t 0d >=σ∗  and 0/td >σ∂∂ ∗  implies that  is always strict positive for  and ∗dt )/(1 2d 4ε>γ
.]1,0[∈σ   
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 post perspective policy diffusion has occurred or not, such that the resulting welfare level 
 or  has to be considered. Obviously, ex post an increase in )t(w dPd ∗ )t(w dNd ∗ σ  leads to an 
increase in welfare if policy diffusion occurs and to a decrease in welfare if policy diffu-
sion does not occur, i.e. 0/)t(w dPd >σ∂∂ ∗  and 0/)t(w dNd <σ∂∂ ∗ .4 Ex ante, however, an in-
crease in σ  has two opposite effects on expected welfare: On the one hand,  in-
creases, on the other hand, 
)t(w d
P
d2
∗σ
)t(w)1( *d
N
d2σ−  decreases. Consequently, a high probability of 
policy diffusion need not be beneficial per se in the ex ante perspective. The reason for this 
result is that a high probability σ  leads to maladjustment in the sense of a too high domes-
tic tax rate if policy diffusion finally does not occur.  
4. First-Mover Behaviour vs. Nash Competition  
In order to explore the consequences of first-mover behaviour by the domestic govern-
ment, it is also interesting to compare the above results with the results of a standard model 
of strategic environmental policy where both governments fix their emission taxes simul-
taneously. In this case, we can restrict the analysis to a two stage game. In order to distin-
guish the outcome of this game from the results derived in the last section, we use upper 
case letters. In the second stage of the modified game, the tax rates Td and Tf are already 
given and the firms simultaneously choose their output levels. This leads to 
32a /)]TT([)T,T(Y dffdd −ε+=  and 32a /)]TT([)T,T(Y fdfdf −ε+=  with the accompanying 
profit levels  for j=d,f. In the first stage of the game, both govern-
ments simultaneously maximize the welfare function 
 for j=d,f. The resulting reaction 
functions can be solved for the following tax rates: 
2
fdjfdj )T,T(Y)T,T( =Π
2
fdjjfdjjfdjfdj )]T,T(Y[)T,T(YT)T,T()T,T(W εγ−ε+Π=
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4 The reason for this is straightforward: On the one hand, if policy diffusion does not occur, the difference 
between the tax rate chosen in period 1 and the ex post optimal tax rate 0dt =σ∗ , is c.p. the higher, the 
higher σ  is. On the other hand, if policy diffusion does occur, the difference between the tax rate chosen in 
period 1 and the ex post optimal tax rate 1dt =σ∗ is c.p. the smaller, the higher σ  is.  
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 In order to analyze whether first-mover behaviour implies a more stringent environmental 
policy in the sense of a higher (domestic or foreign) tax rate, we calculate the difference 
. As shown in Appendix III, the sign of ∗∗ −=Δ ddd Ttt dtΔ  is given by: 
 
[5]          with  
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Let us first consider the special case with probability 0=σ . Under this condition the 
threshold level dγˆ  degenerates to  However, an interior solution with positive 
tax rates requires . Consequently, without any chance for policy diffusion 
(i.e., 
).4/(1ˆ 2d ε=γ
)4/(1 2d ε>γ
0=σ ) first-mover behaviour always implies a smaller domestic tax rate compared to 
the Nash solution. 
In the more general case with 0<σ <1 we obtain such that both outcomes are 
possible. In particular, first-mover behaviour leads to higher tax rates compared to the 
Nash solution if the domestic damage parameter falls short of the threshold level 
)4/(1ˆ 2d ε>γ
dγˆ . The 
latter, in turn, depends on the foreign damage parameter γf, the probability of policy diffu-
sion σ and the emission coefficient ε. In Appendix III we show that the threshold level dγˆ  
is c.p. the larger, the higher the probability of policy diffusion is. The same holds with re-
spect to γf, whereas an increase in ε leads to a smaller threshold level dγˆ . Consequently, 
the outcome that first-mover behaviour implies a more stringent environmental policy 
compared to the Nash case is c.p. the more likely, the higher the probability of policy dif-
fusion σ is, the higher the foreign damage parameter γf is and the smaller the emission co-
efficient ε is.  
5.  Determinants of Policy Diffusion 
A prominent example for environmental policy diffusion is the emergence of car-
bon/energy taxes. The first carbon/energy tax was implemented in Finland in 1990. Since 
then further countries have introduced a similar regulatory measure. The gradual introduc-
tion of carbon/energy taxes is neither the result of harmonization nor of imposition but an 
outcome of policy diffusion (Busch & Jörgens 2005). The first adoptions occurred in the 
Scandinavian countries which in turn took the Finnish example as a model. Later adoptions 
involved institutionalized informational networks (Lazer 2005) whereby other countries 
learned from the early-movers. This process indicates that the notion of policy diffusion 
opposes the belief that change in national policy patterns, e.g. towards a regulatory conver-
gence, is largely due to external structural forces like globalization (Levi-Faur 2005). In-
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 stead the diffusion perspective treats change in trans-national governance as the result of 
non-cooperative but still interdependent national policy making. Consequently, whether a 
first-mover policy will be adopted in another country also depends on internal factors. 
What these determinants have in common is that they are mostly knowledge-based 
(Dolowitz & Marsh 2000), which is also captured in the notions “policy-learning” (Sabat-
ier & Jenkins-Smith 1988) and “lesson drawing” (Rose 1991). Mechanisms such as learn-
ing imply that the potential adopter holds sufficient capacities in terms of integrating a new 
policy into his context. Thus, such an adoption of course gives rise to a host of possible 
impediments and deficiencies: the foreign government may not comprehend the policy; es-
sential information may get lost in transmission; the foreign government receives not 
enough support to implement the policy; lobbying groups may fear the emergence of ad-
verse impacts on their clientele after the policy has been introduced. Especially the last two 
points capture the importance of “advocacy coalitions” which are defined as groups of 
people who “share a particular belief system” and operate on a long-term basis (Sabatier 
1988, p. 139). Hence, a lobby that anticipates the diffusion of a policy which it deems det-
rimental for its clientele has a strong incentive to oppose the adoption of that policy. There-
fore, it will lobby for the refusal of the policy or at least for the implementation of a laxer 
version. The impact of such lobbying activities then depends, amongst others, on the funds 
which are at the advocacy group’s disposal. Consequently, policy diffusion is the less 
probable the stronger the opposition of the affected interest groups is. 
Empirical evidence supports this prediction since the introductions of carbon taxes in the 
USA (1993), Australia (1995), and New Zealand (1997 and again in 2005) failed due to the 
respective domestic industries’ concerns about a decreasing international competitiveness 
(Hoerner & Muller 1996, Tews 2002). These observations indicate that any proposal to in-
troduce a taxation policy will be profoundly debated. The thus emerging opposition ex-
plains why the spread of such taxes has been rather slow compared to other environmental 
policy instruments like, e.g., quotas or feed-in tariffs for renewables in power supply 
(Busch & Jörgens 2005). 
6. Policy Diffusion and the Impact of Lobbying 
Following the discussion in Section 5 it seems sensible to assume within our model that the 
probability of policy diffusion depends on two factors: the magnitude of the adverse im-
pact on the foreign firms’ profits and the degree of their political influence. In order to ac-
count for these considerations, we combine the above model with a strategic lobbying ap-
proach in the spirit of Tullock (1967). In particular, we assume that the foreign government 
can be subdivided into a “regulation group” which promotes the introduction of the opti-
 9
 mal emission tax  and a “non-regulation group” which refuses the taxation of emissions 
at all. Without lobbying activities by the foreign firm, the (exogenous) probability that the 
“regulation group” is successful and policy diffusion occurs is given by the probability 
∗
ft
]1,0[∈σ  as introduced in Section 2.5 In order to describe the impact of the foreign firm’s 
lobbying we use an approach that is similar to the well known “contest success function” 
from the rent-seeking literature (see, e.g., Ursprung 1991): 
 
[6] 
f
f z
z α
σσ += 1)( . 
 
Here zf denotes the lobbying expenditures of the foreign firm, α is a productivity parameter 
that measures the impact of lobbying, and σ(zf) is the resulting probability of policy diffu-
sion. In order to fix the optimal level of lobbying expenditures the foreign firm maximizes 
its expected profit  minus political outlays zf. The resulting first or-
der condition is given by: 
N
ff
P
ff ))z(1()z( πσ−+πσ
 
[7] 1ˆ
)( =⋅∂
∂− f
f
f
z
z πσ      with    . PfNff πππ −≡ˆ
 
The LHS of [7] represents the change in expected profits caused by a marginal increase in 
lobbying expenditures. Consequently, condition [8] states that marginal costs and benefits 
of influencing the political process are balanced: The last dollar spent on lobbying activi-
ties yields an increase in expected profits of just one dollar. Differentiating [6] with respect 
to zf and accounting for the non-negativity condition zf≥0, equation [7] can be solved for 
the optimal amount of lobbying expenditures: 
 
[8] [ ]
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤
>−=∗
min
min
ˆˆ0
ˆˆ1ˆ1
ff
fff
f
if
ifz
ππ
πππσαα      with    σαπ
1ˆ min ≡f . 
 
Equation [8] shows that the foreign firm’s incentive for lobbying is driven by the differ-
ence in profits f , i.e. 0 . However, it also turns out that a positive fπˆ  alone 
does not necessarily imply zf>0: The foreign firm will undertake lobbying efforts only if 
πˆ  ˆ/z ff >π∂∂ ∗
                                                 
5 For simplicity we assume that the possible impact of lobbying activities by environmental pressure groups 
is already included in σ . Alternatively, it would be possible to model the impact of competing lobbying 
activities (see, e.g., Michaelis 1994).  
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 the difference in profits is sufficiently large.6 Moreover, [8] indicates that the optimal 
amount of lobbying expenditures is c.p. the higher, the higher the initial probability of pol-
icy diffusion is, i.e. 0/f >σ∂∗ . Finally, by inserting [8] into [6] we can derive the prob-
ability of policy diffusion that results from the foreign firms’ lobbying a
z∂
ctivities 
 
[9] ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
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≤
>=∗ min
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ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ
)(
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z ππσ
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Taking into account the previous considerations, our model now represents a four stage 
game: In the first stage the domestic government introduces the emission tax td and thereby 
initiates a political process which leads to policy diffusion with probability σ ; in the sec-
ond stage the foreign firm engages in lobbying activities that aim at reducing the probabil-
ity of policy diffusion; in the third stage policy diffusion will occur with probability 
σ≤σ ∗ )z( f  and in the fourth stage the firms choose the amount of output to be sold on the 
third country’s market. Although this game is too complex to allow for an explicit back-
wards solution, it is possible to derive some insights concerning the interaction between 
first-mover behaviour, lobbying activities and policy diffusion. From [2a] and [2b] we can 
calculate the impact of the domestic tax rate td on the foreign firm’s difference in profits:7 
 
[10] 22
222
)21(36
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Assuming an internal solution with  and inserting [10] into [9] yields the probability 
of policy diffusion as a function of the domestic tax rate td: 
0zf >∗
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As indicated by [11], the probability of policy diffusion c.p. the smaller, the higher the 
domestic tax rate td is. This effect is c.p. the larger, the higher the foreign damage parame-
ter γf is and the higher the initial probability σ  is. Moreover, as already derived in Section 
2, the optimal domestic tax rate  is the smaller, the smaller the probability of policy dif-∗dt
                                                 
6 For  the first Dollar spent on lobbying activities would yield an increase in expected profits of 
less than one Dollar such that lobbying doesn’t pay at all for the foreign firm.  
min
ff ˆˆ π<π
7 Note that , i.e., for the case with policy diffusion equation [11] assumes that 
the foreign government adjusts the tax rate tf according to the reaction function [1].  
)t()t()t(ˆ d
P
fd
N
fdf π−π=π
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 fusion is. Consequently, in fixing  the domestic government has to recognize the effect 
of the foreign firms’ lobbying activities, otherwise it will choose a tax rate too high. This 
result highlights that optimal first mover behaviour in environmental policy has to account 
not only for the reaction of the foreign government but also for possible lobbying activities 
which influence this reaction.  
∗
dt
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Policy diffusion describes the process by which a political innovation – like the introduc-
tion of a novel emission tax – disseminates over time among countries. This implies that at 
least one country has to act as a first-mover in terms of policy making. The choice of the 
first-mover is then expected to alter the probability of further policy adoptions. In order to 
analyze this issue from an economic point of view we have developed a simple two-
country-model of the taxation of emissions in presence of (possible) policy diffusion. Con-
trary to the usual approach of simultaneous decisions on tax rates we consider a Stackel-
berg game: In the first step the domestic government introduces an emission tax td thus act-
ing as Stackelberg-leader, in the second step the foreign government decides whether or 
not to introduce an emission tax tf and in the third step the firms decide on their output 
quantities to be sold on a third country’s market. For the case of an exogenous given prob-
ability of policy diffusion we show that the optimal domestic tax rate is c.p. the higher, the 
higher the probability of policy diffusion is. Moreover, we show that first-mover behaviour 
by the domestic government leads to a higher tax rate compared to the Nash solution with 
simultaneous decisions on tax rates if the domestic damage parameter falls short of a criti-
cal threshold. It turns out that this threshold is the higher the higher the probability for pol-
icy diffusion is. 
In the next step we introduce an endogenous probability of policy diffusion by combining 
our model with a strategic lobbying approach. In so doing we obtain a feedback effect in 
the sense that the now endogenous probability of policy diffusion also depends on the 
magnitude of the domestic tax rate: the higher the latter is the smaller the probability is. 
Thus, by taking policy diffusion into consideration we find that the usual prediction of eco-
logical dumping is reversed. However, this result is weakened when the foreign firm is 
able to engage in strategic lobbying. 
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 Appendix I 
Profit maximization by the domestic firm implies: 
 
(I.1) Max! dddfdd yty]yya[ ε−−−=π     →   ]tya[5.0y dfd ε−−= . 
 
Analogously, profit maximization by the foreign firm implies: 
 
(I.2) Max ! ffffdf ytcy]yya[ ε−−−=π   →  ]tcya[5.0y fdf ε−−= , 
 
where c is a dummy variable associated with the foreign tax rate, i.e., we use c=1 for the case with policy dif-
fusion and c=0 for the case without policy diffusion, respectively. Solving [I.1] and [I.2] for the equilibrium 
yields: 
 
(I.3) ]t2ct(a)[31(y dfd −ε+= ,                (I.4) )]ct2t(a)[31(y fdf −ε+= . 
Appendix II 
Differentiating  with respect to σ, γd and γf and rearranging terms yields: ∗dt
(II.1)   ))))]43(414(4(1)(14([a72
t 2
fd
22
fdf
22
f
2d εγ+γε+−εγγ+γε+−εγϕεω=σ∂
∂ ∗
 
(II.2)   )]207)(21()41()182(20256[a6
t 2
f
2
f
22
f
2242
f
2
f
4
d
d εγ+εγ+εγ−σ+−εγ+εγσ−ϕω
ε=γ∂
∂ ∗ , 
(II.3)   ))]32(1()41()))3))45(3(4(8(1(8[a36
t 2
d
2
d
22
f
2
fdf
2
df
2
f
d −εγεγ+σεγ−+−εγ+γ+γεγ+γε+ϕω
εσ=γ∂
∂ ∗
, 
where ω indicates  and 
 indicates . Due to  we obtain  from (II.1). With respect to 
(II.2), ambiguity concerning the sign could arise from the term . How-
ever, the maximum possible value of σ is σ=1. Inserting this and accounting for , the term un-
der consideration can be recalculated as  which proofs 
. Finally, (II.3) contains two terms that might be ambiguous, the first one of which is 
. However, this can be factorized as  
The second ambiguous term is  which cannot be ruled out to be negative. However, 
due to σ≤1 it suffices to show for σ =1 that the complete expression on the RHS of (II.3) is positive even if 
 is negative. Inserting σ=1 into (II.3), accounting for ω as well as φ and rearranging 
terms yields: 
0])21)(21(32)5)417(28)(14([ 222f
2
d
2
fd
4
fd
2
f >εγ+εγ+−−εγ−γ+εγγ−εγσ≡ω
ϕ 0)21( 2f >εγ+≡ϕ )4/(1 2f ε>γ 0/td >σ∂∂ ∗
242
f
2
f
4 )182(20256 −εγ+εγσ−ϕ
)21( 2f εγ+≡ϕ
0)]2237(859[)21(4 2f
2
f
22
f >εγ+εγ+εγ+
0/t dd >γ∂∂ ∗
3))45(3(4 2fdf
2 −εγ+γ+γε .0)14(31620 2f2fd2d >−εγ+εγγ+εγ
))32(1( 2d
2
d −εγεγ+σ
))32(1( 2d
2
d −εγεγ+σ
  
(II.4)   
24
fdfd
222
f
22
f
42
d
2
f
2
f
2
d
22
f
1
f
d
]4)43(1[)43(
])43(2)43)(14()41[(a4t
εγγ+γ+γε+εγ+
εγ+εγ+εγ+−εγεγ+εγ+ε=γ∂
∂
=σ
∗
. 
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 Due to  the expression on the RHS of (II.4) is positive which completes the proof for . )4/(1 2f ε>γ 0/t fd >γ∂∂ ∗
Appendix III 
Calculating the difference  from [3] and [4a] yields: ∗∗ −=Δ ddd Ttt
(III.1)   
32
1
dt ωω
ω−=Δ  
           with   , ))7)1(322(45)1(644)(14)(21(a2 42d
2
f
42
d
2
f
2
f1 σ+−σεγ+εγ+σ+−σεγ+−εγεγ+≡ω
           and   , ]16)(125[ 4fd
2
fd2 εγγ+εγ+γ+ε≡ω
           and   . 22f
2
d
4
fd
2
fd
2
f3 )21)(21(32]528)417)[(14( εγ+εγ+−−εγγ+εγ−γ−εγσ≡ω
We first show that the denominator is always negative such that the sign of dtΔ  depends only on the sign of 
the numerator. Due to ω2>0 the sign of the denominator equals the sign of ω3. By expanding and rearranging 
terms this expression can be recalculated as: 
 
(III.2)  42f
4
fd
2
f
2
d3 )16128()40256()16128()1764(325 εγσ+−εγγσ−−εγσ+−εγσ+−−σ=ω
                    . 62fd)112256( εγγσ−−
 
Due to σ≤1 we obtain ω3<0 such that the denominator of (III.1) is always negative. Now we turn to the nu-
merator whose sign is ambiguous. However, by solving the inequalities ω1>0 and ω1<0 for γd we obtain: 
 
(III.3)    with   ⎩⎨
⎧
γ>γ<
γ<γ>ω
dd
dd
1 ˆif0
ˆif0 2/1
d 64
ˆ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ϕ≡γ  and  
)1)(21(
)72(454
2
f
4
2
f
σ−εγ+ε
σ+εγ+σ+≡ϕ . 
 
This completes the proof of [5]. Finally, we consider the derivatives of dγˆ  with respect to fγ ,  and σ ε . The 
signs of these derivatives are identical with the signs of the respective derivatives of ϕ : 
 
(III.4) 0
)2)(1(
18
23
ff
>εγ+εσ−
σ=γ∂
ϕ∂ , 
 
(III.5) 0
)1)(21(
)41(9
22
f
4
2
f >−σεγ+ε
εγ+=σ∂
ϕ∂ , 
 
(III.6) 0
)1()21(
))]72(82916(54[4
22
f
5
2
f
2
f <−σεγ+ε
σ+εγ+σ+εγ+σ+=ε∂
ϕ∂ . 
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